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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FIREMAN'S
RULE IN OHIO'
The Ohio firemen's rule prevents firemen and policemen from recovering against
tortfeasorsfor personal injuries arisingfrom the tortfeasor's ordinary negligence.
While severaljurisdictions have abolished the rule, Ohio persists in applying it,
although it does so in an arguably inconsistent manner. This Note suggests that the
rule violates Ohio's Constitution and the authorfurther argues that Ohio courts
should shift the current basis of liability.

UNDER OHIO COMMON LAW, firemen and policemen cannot
recover against tortfeasors for personal injuries suffered as a result of the tortfeasor's ordinary negligence.2 The fireman's rule is
still in effect in Ohio, and its underlying theory has remained unchanged from the date of its adoption in 1923.1
While a few states have abolished the fireman's rule,4 other
states have adopted new legal theories for maintaining it.' These
1. See Note, Torts, 34 DRAKE L. 11Ev. 1109, 1119 n.99 (1984-86) [hereinafter Torts].
See also, Comment, An Examinationof the CaliforniaFireman'sRule, 6 PAc. L.J. 660 (1975)
[hereinafter Examination]; Note, Torts, 14 SETON HALL L. l1v. 759 (1983-84); Comment,
Torts, 18 RUTGERs L.J. 261 (1986).
2. Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963);
Gray v. Ohio Gas & Borg-Warner, No. 84AP-399, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1985);
Eckert v. The Refiners Co., 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923).
It should be mentioned at the outset that the fireman's rule applies to firemen and policemen alike. See Scheurer, 175 Ohio St. at 166, 192 N.E.2d at 41. For the sake of brevity, the
examples throughout this Note will refer only to firemen. It should be understood that everything stated applies to policemen as well. The author has used firemen to simplify the illustrations as policemen respond to a larger variety of situations than do firemen.
3. The status of licensee was first applied to firemen and policemen in Eckert, 17 Ohio
App. at 221.
4. The fireman's rule was abolished in Oregon by the Supreme Court's decision in
Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984). See generally Comment, TortsAbolition of the Fireman'sRule in Oregon and What It May Mean for Tennessee, 15 MEM.
ST. U.L. REv. 312 (1985) [hereinafter Oregon Abolition].
The rule may also have been abolished in Minnesota by that state's supreme court in Lang
v. Glusica, 393 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1986) (fireman's rule cannot bar recovery by a police
officer for injuries received through the intentional or negligent acts of another). However,
the majority of jurisdictions still apply the fireman's rule.
5. California and Minnesota are two of the states which have adopted new theories for
maintaining the fireman's rule. The following law review articles provide good historical
discussions of the modification and development of the fireman's rule rationale: See Torts,
supra note 1; Oregon Abolition, supra note 4; Comment, The Fireman'sRule: Defining It's
Scope Using the Cost Spreading Rationale, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 218 (1983) [hereinafter Cost
Spreading];Examination,supranote 1; Note, Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman'sRule,
7 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 749 (1981) [hereinafter Assumption of Risk]; CaliforniaSupreme
Court Review, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 167 (1982); Note, The New MinnesotaFireman'sRule
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new theories take the forms of assumption of the risk6 and public
policy cost spreading rationales.7 Ohio, on the other hand, relies
upon the traditional notions of liability of landowners to entrants
upon their property in upholding the fireman's rule.8 Because firemen and policemen acquire the right to enter property by virtue of
authority granted by the state, they ought to fall between the classifications of licensee and invitee.9 However, Ohio common law has
placed them in the licensee category, thereby relinquishing firemen's rights of recovery against a property owner for ordinary negligence which they would have enjoyed as invitees.1 0
This Note examines the firemen's rule as it stands in Ohio today
and argues that it is outdated and applied inconsistently. Further,
this Note will show that the fireman's rule operates in violation of
the equal protection provision of the Ohio Constitution and will
urge the Ohio courts to shift the basis upon which liability is currently predicated, to one which will promote fairness and consistency in this area of tort law.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE FIREMAN'S RULE IN OHIO

A.

The Development of Ohio's Fireman'sRule

In 1921, the Ohio Supreme Court restated the duty owed by a
landowner to a licensee in Hannan v. Ehrlich.1 A landowner owes
a licensee a duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly and to warn
-An Application of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Armstrong v. Mailand, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 848 (1980) [hereinafter Minn. Fireman'sRule].
6. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979). See generally Assumption of Risk, supra, note 5 (discussing Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to replace
"the old 'fireman's rule,' with a modem rule based upon primary assumption of the risk");
but see Minn. Fireman'sRule, supra note 5 (a criticism of the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision of the assumption of risk policy justification for abandonment of the fireman's rule).
7. See Cost Spreading, supra note 5.
8. See Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38
(1963) (police officer entering private property in order to carry out his official duty is a
licensee to whom the landowner is not liable for ordinary negligence); Gray v. Ohio Gas &
Borg-Warner, No. 84AP-399, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1985) (fireman is a licensee to
whom no duty is owed for ordinary negligence). See also Eckert v. The Refiners Co., 17 Ohio
App. 221 (1923) (fireman responding to fire alarm is a licensee on the premises, and owner of
the premises has a duty to exercise ordinary care only after discovering him in peril);
Terlesky v. Miller, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 85, 193 N.E.2d 289 (1963) (policeman not owed duty of
care because of his status as a "mere licensee").
9. Sheurer, 175 Ohio St. at 176, 192 N.E.2d at 46 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 171, 192 N.E.2d at 46.
11. 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921) (child killed while playing in a sand bank on
private property was a licensee to whom no greater duty was owed in spite of his minor
status).
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him of hidden dangers.12
In the later case of DiGildo v. Caponi,13 which posed similar
facts, the court reaffirmed the classification system as a basis for
determining the duty owed by landowners to entrants on their
land. 4 The court relied on stare decisis and declined to require
landowners to act with due care towards all entrants on their property.'1 Indeed, in recent decisions, the Ohio courts have not strayed
beyond the boundaries that stare decisis has established.' 6
In Eckert v. The Refiners Co., 7 a fireman was killed while fighting a fire on the premises of defendant's oil company. The court
was forced to define the "status of the fireman" 8 and the duty owed
to him by the landowner upon whose property the fire arose. Citing
cases from nearby states for support, 19 the court held that "a fireman who enters upon the premises, or into a building in case of fire
is a licensee." 20 The plaintiff who sued on the fireman's behalf
claimed that the oil company owner was negligent both in his maintenance of the premises and in his failure to impose safety standards
upon his employees. 2 1 Despite this argument, the court held that
because the fireman was a licensee, the landowner had no duty to
avoid ordinary negligence.2 2 Under the Hannan rule, liability
would be imposed upon the landowner only if it could be shown
that he was "wanton or wilfull" in his acts or omissions toward the
fireman while on the premises or failed to exercise ordinary care
after discovering him to be in peril.2 3 The fireman in the 1939 case
12. Id. at 176, 131 N.E.2d at 505:
A licensee takes his license subject to its attendant perils and risks, and the licensor
owes him no duty except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him and to
exercise ordinary care after discovering him to be in peril; he should not be exposed
to hidden dangers, pitfalls or obstructions.
13. 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969).
14. Id. at 128, 247 N.E.2d at 734.
15. Id. at 131, 247 N.E.2d at 734:
[W]e are urged in this case to eliminate distinctions based upon the status of a
visitor upon premises and to adopt a rule of ordinary care under all the circumstances as the measure of the duty of a landowner or landoccupier. This court,
however, is convinced that a just measure of judicial restraint requires that this
question be deferred to a later day and to another case.
16. See Gray v. Ohio Gas & Borg-Warner, No.84AP-399, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June
18, 1985).
17. 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923). This case established the precedent for applying the fireman's rule.
18. Id. at 222.
19. The decision cites cases from the jurisdictions of Illinois, Indiana and Minnesota.
20. Eckert, 17 Ohio App. at 222.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 222-23.
23. Id.
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of James v. Cities Service Oil Co.2 4 was injured as a result of a hidden danger known to the landowner but unrevealed to the fireman.
The court of appeals reversed a judgment for the defendant and
held that if the jury found that there was a hidden defect, the defendant landowner may be liable if he failed to warn the licensee of
25
the defect.
In Terlesky v. Miller,26 a 1963 case, the plaintiff police officer,
who was injured when he fell through an open trap door, sued the
building owner for damages. His theory was that the owner should
have revealed the danger about which the police officer had little
chance of learning. Rejecting the hidden danger theory by finding
the plaintiff contributorily negligent for stepping into the dark, the
court found for the defendant. 27 The court held that the police officer was "obviously a mere28 licensee . . . [and had] no invitation
express or implied existed."
In the same year the Ohio Supreme Court decided Scheurer v.
Trustee of Open Bible Church.29 Here, a policeman answering a
breaking and entering call on defendant's property was injured
when he fell into an open excavation. The supreme court reaffirmed
the majority rule-that policemen are mere licensees-but noted
the existence of a hidden danger exception to the general rule.30
While the earlier cases found no landowner liability on what
seemed to be a strict stare decisis basis, the Scheurer court presented
a policy rationale for the fireman's rule. The court argued that because the time and manner of a fireman's visit is so unpredictable,
too great an imposition would be placed on the landowner if he was
required to always keep his land in the safest condition. 3
The most recent fireman's rule case, decided in 1985, Gray v.
Ohio Gas & Borg-Warner,3 2 was brought by a fireman who was injured when liquid propane exploded on defendant's property.
Although the gas was stored in violation of a safety ordinance, the
property owner was not held to owe a duty toward the fireman to
24.
(1942).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E.2d 872 (1939), aff'd, 140 Ohio St. 314, 43 N.E.2d 276
Id. at 96-97, 31 N.E.2d at 876.
28 Ohio Op. 2d 85, 193 N.E.2d 289 (1963).
Id. at 86, 193 N.E.2d at 290.
Id.
175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963).
Id. at 168, 192 N.E.2d at 41.
Id. at 170-71, 192 N.E.2d at 43.
No. 84 AP-399, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1985).
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refrain from ordinary negligence.3 3 The decision cited the Scheurer
court's policy statements in support of its holding.
This Note has illustrated then, that the fireman's rule, as it is in
force today in Ohio, is founded upon the traditional landowner's
duty system of law. While leaving the foundation undisturbed,
courts have attempted to add further support to the rule by discussing public policy rationales. However, neither the outdated common law nor the new public policy rationales provide sufficient
reasons for maintaining the fireman's rule.
B.

Classificationof Firemen and Policemen as Licencees is
Incongruent in Light of the Traditional
ClassificationSystem

1. Explanation of the TraditionalClassificationSystem of
Entrants on Property
In order to argue that firemen and policemen are improperly
classified as licensees, this Note must first examine those types of
plaintiffs which the courts in Ohio have traditionally treated as
licensees. A licensee is "[a] person who goes upon the lands of another by permission and acquiescence, for his own pleasure, convenience, or benefit, and not by invitation."3 4 In Garrard v.
McComas,3 5 the court stated, "[a licensee is] [o]ne whose presence
upon the land is solely for his own purpose... in which the possessor has no interest....
In contrast, under Ohio law an invitee is defined as one who is
"invited to come upon the premises, either expressly or im38
pliedly. ' '37 The Ohio Supreme Court in Scheibel v. Lipton
stressed that the distinguishing characteristic of an invitee, as opposed to a licensee, is that he is on the landowner's property for the
benefit of the landowner. 39 Harper v. Maple Heights Construction
Co.40 presents an example of a licensee as "one who passes through
an amusement park not yet open."'4 1 On the other hand, the court
33. Id.
34. Hannan v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921).
35. 5 Ohio App. 3d 179, 450 N.E.2d 730 (1982).
36. Id. at 181, 450 N.E.2d at 732 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 175,
§ 330 comment h).
37. Englehardt v. Phillips, 136 Ohio St. 73, 23 N.E.2d 829 (1939).
38. 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
39. Id. at 329, 102 N.E.2d at 463; accord, Durst v. Van Gundy, 8 Ohio App. 3d 72, 455
N.E.2d 1319 (1982).
40. 6 Abs. 73 (1927) (Ohio Law Abstract, no official reporter).
41. Id.
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in Bowins v. Euclid GeneralHospitalAssociation4 2 classified a hospito visit
tal visitor as an invitee because he has an implied invitation
43
well-being.
patient's
the
to
contributed
and his presence
The duty owed by a landowner to an invitee is greater than that
owed to a licensee. A landowner owes the invitee a duty of reasonable care." If he expressly or impliedly invites one to enter his
property, the landowner is liable for any injury resulting from an
unreasonably unsafe condition on the premises.4 5 Therefore, if firemen and policemen were classified as invitees, landowners would be
liable to them for ordinary negligence in the maintenance of their
properties. This would not include liability for negligently causing
a fire, as one cannot achieve that level of duty on a licensee/invitee
theory alone.
2. A Fireman is More Like an Invitee Then a Licensee
A strong argument can be made for classifying firemen as invitees and not as licensees. The primary distinction between the two
classes is the difference in who enjoys the benefit of the visit. As
previously stated, a licensee benefits from his entrance on the premises.4 6 An invitee's visit benefits the landowner. 47 Firemen come to
the property of a landowner not for their own welfare but to save
the life and property of the owner. Arguably, there is either an express or implied invitation for the fireman to come to extinguish the
fire. An express invitation exists when the property owner calls the
fire department and asks them to come to save his land. The implied invitation may be said to exist by virtue of a common understanding that one whose property, and perhaps life, is endangered,
welcomes the help of the fireman who represents safety and a
chance to preserve his possessions..
How dissimilar are the fireman who enters to put out a fire and
an amusement park patron who visits after business hours? The
first comes for the benefit of another, while the second visits for his
own pleasure. On the other hand, the fireman shares a close kinship
with the hospital visitor whose visit is expected and whose presence
contributes to the occupant's well-being.
42. 20 Ohio App. 3d 29, 484 N.E.2d 203 (1984).
43. Id. An invitee may share the benefit of his visit with the landowner as does, for
example, a salesman.
44. Schiebel, 156 Ohio St. at 315, 102 N.E.2d at 458.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The oft-cited Illinois Supreme Court case, Dini v. Naiditch,4 8 attacks the fireman's licensee status. The court found inconsistent the
ideas that a fireman cannot be an invitee because he has no invitation, yet can be a licensee even though he is on the landowner's
property without permission.4 9
In refusing to grant firemen invitee status, the Ohio courts have
expressed concern that a landowner is unable to protect himself
from liability because he never knows when a fireman will visit his
property and, therefore, does not have "a reasonable opportunity to
make the premises safe or to warn them of any dangerous condition."50 This problem can be alleviated by creating distinctions and
classifications in the law. For example, the law could divide the
landowners into two categories based upon the directness of their
relationship to the fireman.
One category would be comprised of the landowner over whose
property the fireman must cross in order to extinguish a fire on an
adjacent piece of land. In relation to this landowner, the fireman is
a licensee. He enters without invitation, expressed or implied, but
his presence is permitted by the landowner. He confers no direct
benefit upon the landowner.
The second category consists of the landowner upon whose
property a fire ignites. His call for help can be viewed as an express
invitation to enter the land. In the absence of a call, an invitation is
implied based upon a common understanding that one whose property is on fire would welcome the aid of a fireman. As the landowner derives a direct benefit from the fireman's presence, the
fireman responding to his need for help is an invitee. Also, as the
property owner now expects the fireman, he will be able to fulfill his
duty to warn of any hidden danger or defect on the premises. These
distinctions are both fair to the fireman and consistent with the
traditional landowner's duty classification system.
C. Firemen are Classified as Invitees in the SurroundingStates
Three jurisdictions which surround Ohio, specifically New
York, 5 Illinois5" and Massachusetts,5 3 refuse to classify firemen
48. 20 I11.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
49. Id. at 415-16, 170 N.E.2d at 885.
50. Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 171, 192 N.E.2d 38,
43 (1963).
51. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491(1920).
52. Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 406, 170 N.E.2d at 881.
53. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E. 2d 43 (1973).
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and policemen as licensees. Each jurisdiction has declined to treat
firemen as licensees because of the public benefit which they confer.5" The law of each of these jurisdictions proves to be both more
logical in applying the definitions of licensee and invitee and more
fair in the protection which it affords firemen.
The common law of the state of Illinois has altered the fireman's
rule to provide greater protection for firemen and policemen. In
5 the Illinois Supreme
Dini v. Naiditch,"
Court rejected the traditional common law rule treating firemen as licensees. 6 Finding the
classification system to be outdated, the court held that a reasonable
duty of care was owed in light of the benefit which the fireman offers to property owners. 7 Dini involved a suit brought on behalf of
two firemen, one severely injured and the other killed, in a hotel
fire.58 The defendants, the building owner and occupant, violated
safety ordinances and building inspection codes. 9 The court held
that the safety ordinance was intended for the benefit of firemen in
addition to the general public.6" Violation of these codes was negligence per se, and because the firemen were invitees, ordinary negligence was actionable. 1
The Illinois cases following Dini define the limits of the landowner's duty to the fireman. In Horcher v. Guerin,62 a fireman was
injured while fighting a fire in a building which should have been
demolished because of its dangerous condition.6 3 According to the
Horcher court, Dini left ambiguity in the law as to the nature of
negligence for which a landowner is liable to the fireman.' The
court interpreted Dini as holding that a landowner cannot be held
liable for negligently causing a fire.6 5 However, a landowner does
have a "duty not to expose [a fireman] to an unreasonable risk of
harm - that is, a duty to remove hidden, unusual or not to be
54. Dini, 20 Ill 2d at 415-16, 170 N.E.2d. at 886; Mounsey, 363 Mass. at 702, 297
N.E.2d at 48; Meiers, 229 N.Y. at 15, 127 N.E. at 492.
55. 20 Ill.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1961).
56. Id. at 416, 170 N.E.2d at 885.
57. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
58. Id. at 409, 170 N.E.2d at 882.
59. Id. at 410, 170 N.E.2d at 883.
60. Id. at 419, 170 N.E.2d at 887.
61. Id. at 415-16, 170 N.E.2d at 885 (Although the court did not explicitly confer invitee status on the fireman, its explicit rejection of licensee status and adoption of an obligation
of reasonable care on behalf of the property owner implies the adoption of invitee status.)
62. 94 I11.
App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (1968).
63. Id. at 245, 236 N.E.2d at 577.
64. Id. at 246, 236 N.E.2d at 578.
65. Id. at 247-48, 236 N.E.2d at 578-579.
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expected dangers from the premises or to give adequate warning
thereof."6 6
In Erickson v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. ,67 the court affirmed a dismissal of plaintiff fireman's complaint because the injury
was due to his exposure to the fire.6" Similarly, in Facil v. OSE
Foods, Inc.,69 the defendant landowner was held not liable to a policeman for the injuries he received when criminals attacked him in
a badly lit area of the owner's property. 70 The "risk of ambush"
was held to be a risk "inherent" to the policeman's work and was
therefore not an unreasonable act of negligence by the defendant.7 1
The common law of New York also has deviated from the traditional fireman's rule. Dini72 cited Meiers v. FredKoch Brewery7 3 as

persuasive precedent for its rejection of the traditional fireman's
rule. In Melers, the plaintiff fire chief was injured when he fell into
a coal hole while fighting a fire on defendant's property. 74 In refusing to prolong the fireman's licensee status, the court explained that
while a licensee enters by virtue of consent and acceptance, the fireman and policeman do not enter by such permission.7 5 Should a
landowner refuse to consent, the fireman or policeman is authorized
by the state to enter the property. He is "engaged in the business of
the public," and he confers a benefit upon the landowner.76
In the New York cases which follow Meiers, the courts recognized that firemen and policemen fall between the categories of licensee and invitee. In Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties,7 7 the
court held that while a fireman is neither an invitee nor a licensee,
66. Id. at 248, 236 N.E.2d at 579.
67. 21 Ill. App. 3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1974).
68. Id. at 549, 315 N.E.2d at 914. See also Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 I11.
2d 103, 108, 361 N.E.2d 282, 285 (1976) (the function of a fireman is to deal with fires, and he
assumes the risks normally associated with that function when he enters upon that
employment).
69. 60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
70. Id. at 554, 328 N.E.2d at 534. See also Murphy v. Ambassador East, 54 Ill. App. 3d
980, 370 N.E.2d 124 (1977) (citing Facilfor the proposition that if the risk of harm was of the
type a property owner could reasonably expect those on the property to be aware of, injuries
resulting therefrom do not create liability).
71. Id. at 558, 328 N.E. 2d at 541.
72. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 414, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
Id. at 10, 127 N.E. at 491.
Id. at 14-15, 127 N.E. at 492.
Id. at 15, 127 N.E. at 492.
4 A.D.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957).
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he is owed a duty of reasonable care.7 8 In essence, while the label
has changed, the duty owed to the fireman is the same as that owed
to an invitee.
A recent New York Court of Claims case clarifies the limit of
this duty. In Santangelo v. State,79 an escaped mental patient
stabbed two police officers who were attempting to confine him.
When the police officers sued the state for negligently allowing him
to escape, the court held that police officers cannot recover for injuries "caused by another's negligence which creates the very occasion for their engagement." 8 This statement defines the fireman's
I
rule as it exists in New York today.
The New York court cited public policy to substantiate its holding. The court suggested that policemen are already sufficiently
compensated for the risks they are required to take and that the
public should not have a duty to provide policemen with a risk-free
environment. 8 '
The fireman's rule in Massachusetts has undergone a more dramatic evolution. In the early cases, both firemen and policemen
were licensees with the traditional duty of care owed to them. 2
However, in later cases the Massachusetts courts reclassified the
status of firemen and policemen. For example, in Learoyd v. Godfrey, 83 the supreme court held a landowner liable to a police officer
who suffered injuries when he fell into a hole on defendant's property while answering a call for help. Similarly in Mounsey v. Ellard,84 the court allowed a policeman to recover for injuries suffered
when he slipped on ice on defendant's premises while delivering a
summons. The court held that the policeman was "an implied invitee to whom the defendants owed a duty of reasonable care to keep
78. Id. at 281, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 280-81; see also McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26
A.D.2d 186, 191-92, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698, 707 (1966).
79. 129 Misc. 2d 898, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1985).
80. Id. at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
81. Id. at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54-55.
82. See Carroll v. Hemenway, 315 Mass. 45, 51 N.E.2d 952 (1944) (investigating police
officer, injured upon falling into an elevator shaft, treated as a licensee); Aldworth v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936) (fireman who fell from fire escape
while performing duties could not recover in tort for simple negligence); Brennan v. Keene,
237 Mass. 556, 130 N.E. 82 (1921) (policeman who entered building and fell through trap
door held to be a licensee); Blackstone v. Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321, 49 N.E.
635 (1898) (employee fireman treated as licensee when injured due to construction on employer's premises).
83. 138 Mass. 315 (1885).
84. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
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the route of access to their premises in reasonably safe condition.""5
The court found that the fireman's licensee status unfairly favors
the landowners and that courts have granted firemen and other public servants
invitee status to avoid the inequitable effects of the
86
rule.
To summarize, under the common law of Illinois, New York
and Massachusetts, a fireman who enters property to respond to a
fire is an invitee and a landowner owes him a duty not to expose
him to an unreasonable risk. However, the landowner is not liable
for any injury which results from an inherent risk of the occupations of firemen and policemen.
In examining these jurisdictions, we find that the Ohio courts
have not reached the same point in their development of the fireman's rule. The decisions of the three jurisdictions reveal that the
traditional landowner's duty system can no longer account for these
modem occupations. As these states continue to question the duty
owed to firemen, so too should the Ohio courts challenge the antiquated basis of Ohio's fireman's rule.
D. The ClassificationSystem of Landowner Liability is Outdated
As the courts in Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts have
begun to classify firemen and policemen as invitees, they seem to
have done so more to increase the duty owed-to government officials
who confer a public benefit than because they feel that a fireman
falls completely within the definition of an invitee.87 The Mounsey
court went so far as to abandon the entrant classification system
and to expressly overrule all prior decisions finding liability on that
basis. 8 The court opined, "[w]e can no longer follow this ancient
and largely discredited common law distinction which favors the
free use of property without due regard to the personal safety of
those individuals who have heretofore been classified as
licensees." 8 9
One can argue that the landowner/entrant classification system
does not provide adequately for the issue of landowner's liability to
firemen and policemen. The Ohio courts need to update the common law fireman's rule as its foundation has eroded. However, in85. Id. at 700, 297 N.E.2d at 47.
86. Id. at 701, 297 N.E.2d at 48.
87. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 61, at 396 (4th ed. 1971). See, eg., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363
Mass. 693, 702, 297 N.E.2d 43, 49 (1973).
88. Mounsey, 363 Mass. at 707-09, 297 N.E.2d at 51-53.
89. Id. at 706-07, 297 N.E.2d at 51.
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stead of developing the rule to the point where firemen are awarded
invitee status, the courts should advance further to the point of
abandoning the entrant's classification system altogether.
The fireman's rule is a legal vehicle for limiting the landowner's
liability. The law should undergo a shift in focus to the traditional
basis of liability in tort law - the fault concept. In the interests of
justice and fairness, the liability of the landowner should depend
upon whether or not he is at fault.
In restructuring the liability, the law must account for the various situations which present different degrees of fault on the part of
the landowner. One could describe three types of scenarios which
imply varying levels of fault and, therefore, liability. The first type
of situation would occur when the fireman crosses the landowner's
property to extinguish a fire on adjacent land. By analogy, a policeman runs across a person's property in pursuit of a criminal. The
landowner here has no relation to the fire or to the crime. He is as
an innocent bystander and owes only that general duty of reasonable care to the fireman that he owes to all persons.
A second scenario involves a landowner upon whose property a
fire is started through no fault of the landowner's. By analogy, a
crime occurs on a landowner's premises, but the owner is not involved in the crime. Because this landowner was not at fault, he
becomes a victim himself. He, too, owes only a general duty of
care.
A third category is created when it is the landowner's own negligence or intentional act which starts a fire. This class also includes
the person whose negligence facilitates a crime and the criminal
himself who injures the police officer during his arrest. The fireman
or policeman responding to this call for help is owed a higher duty
based upon the degree of fault shown. This defendant should be
liable for injuries resulting both directly and indirectly from the fire
or the crime.
While increasing the duty of care owed to firemen for injury
caused by the condition of the property, this analysis goes further to
abolish the fireman's rule where a person's negligence or intentional
act caused the fire or the crime. Although this analysis deviates
greatly from the fireman's rule in Ohio, as well as the surrounding
jurisdictions, it finds support in new trends for defining liability in
Illinois and California.
Two important decisions abolished the landowner classifications
system altogether and adopted new methods for treating the issue of
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liability to entrants on property, Dini v. Naiditch,9° discussed earlier, and Rowland v. Christian.9 In Rowland, the California
Supreme Court abolished the entrant classification system as a determinant of liability. 92 Instead, the court relied upon foreseeability
of the risk to define the duty owed by a property owner to his visitor. 93 As a result of Rowland, a property owner in California owes
a general duty of care to any person upon his property and to maintain his property in a reasonably safe condition.94 In summary, in
defining the duty owed to firemen by landowners, the Ohio courts
should abandon the landowners duty system altogether. That system cannot be adequately applied to the relationship between a
landowner and an entering fireman. Instead, the Ohio courts
should adhere to the traditional tort fault concept; equating the
amount of liability with the level of fault.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FIREMAN'S RULE
There is another strong argument for eliminating the Ohio
courts' reliance on the entrant classification system or, in the alternative, for promoting the fireman's status by modifying the fireman's rule. Under the current rule, firemen and policemen are
denied equal protection in that there is a lower duty owed to them
as visitors upon land than is owed to other similarly situated visitors. This Note will first examine the equal protection clause of the
Ohio Constitution as it has been interpreted in Ohio case law. Second, it will argue that firemen and policemen have been denied
equal protection in light of the higher status awarded, first to other
state employees and second, to other rescuers.
A.

Equal Protection Under the Ohio Constitution

The Equal Protection clause of the Ohio Constitution provides,
"[a]ll power is inherent in the people... [g]overnment is instituted
for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to
alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it
necessary.... "195
90. 20 II. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
91. 69 Cal. App. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
92. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. See also Examination, supra note
1, at 664; Note, The "Fireman'sRule'" Open Season on Firemen and Policemen, 14 U. WEST
L.A. L. REv. 89, 90 (1982) [hereinafter Open Season].
93. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
94. Id. See also Examination, supra note 1.
95. OHIO CONST. art. I,

§ 2.
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This doctrine has been interpreted to require that "class legislation apply alike to all persons within a class, and that reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those within and
those without a designated class." 9 6
In City of Xenia v. Schmidt,97 a city ordinance prohibited any
obstruction of a public street or other public property. 9s The ordinance exempted already existing permanent obstructions.99 When
the constitutionality of the ordinance was challenged, the Ohio
Supreme Court examined the classifications created by the ordinance."°° The court found four classifications: "temporary" obstructions, "future" obstructions, "permanent" obstructions, and
"obstructions already abutting on any street."'' In analyzing the
equal protection challenge, the court began by defining the classes
created and then compared and contrasted them to determine
whether the differential treatment was justified. The Xenia court
explained:
In definition we have two propositions involved: first, the genius of the thing defined, and, second, the differential or the thing
by which the particular thing defined is distinguished from other
things of its class or group ... 02
The test ...is this: Is there a real and substantial distinction
in the classification attempted, or is it merely artificial, arbitrary
or fictitious made
for the purpose of avoiding constitutional
03
requirements?1
In applying this test to the facts of Xenia, the court held the
ordinance valid on the grounds that "[t]he classification into things
temporary and permanent is of such long standing and so general in
its application to all kinds of conditions and structures that to ask
the question is to affirmatively answer it."'" The court concluded
that because there is a recognized difference between the temporary
and the permanent, the differential treatment of temporary and permanent obstructions was justified.
96. State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 134, 243 N.E.2d 66, 71 (1968); Porter v.
Oberlin, I Ohio St. 2d 143, 151-52, 205 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1965); City of Xenia v. Schmidt,
191 Ohio St. 437, 451-52, 130 N.E. 24, 28 (1920).
97. 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920).
98. Id. at 439, 130 N.E. at 24.
99. Id. at 447, 130 N.E. at 27.
100. Id. at 446-47, 130 N.E. at 27.
101. Id. at 447, 130 N.E. at 27.
102. Id. at 448, 130 N.E. at 27.
103. Id. at 451-52, 130 N.E. at 28.
104. Id. at 452, 130 N.E. at 28.
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In another case, Senior v. Ratterman,10 5 the court addressed the
equal protection issue as it relates to occupations, an area closer to
the subject of this Note. The issue was whether wholesalers of intoxicating liquor should be subjected to the same tax as the manufacturers. 106 The court further clarified the requirements of equal
protection by holding that the law treat similarly situated persons
uniformly.10 7 The court held that there is a "real, tangible difference"'1 between wholesalers and manufacturers that accounts for
the wholesalers' exemption. In summary, the equal protection
clause of the Ohio Constitution has been interpreted by the Ohio
courts as requiring equal treatment of equally situated persons.
Further, if two groups are treated differently, the courts will examine their characteristics to determine whether there are sufficient
differences to justify their differential treatment.
B. Firemen are Denied Equal Protection of the Law by Their
Licensee Status 109
1. Other Public Employees are Invitees
Traditionally, city and state employees, excluding firemen and
policemen, have been classified as invitees. 10 Recognizing that
there is scant Ohio case law classifying any type of public servant,
this Note will examine the case law of the surrounding jurisdictions,
Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts, for an indication of the status of public employees.
In Illinois, public servants, such as postmen and revenue inspectors, are categorized as invitees. 1 1 For example, the plaintiff in
Roewe v. Lombardo,"2 a postman, sued a store owner for damages
for the injuries which he incurred when he was hit by the owner's
car in the parking lot immediately after delivering mail to the defendant's store. The Illinois Supreme Court permitted his recovery.11 3 Thus, this case illustrates that city employees in Illinois are
105. 44 Ohio St. 661, 11 N.E. 321 (1887).
106. Id. at 670, 11 N.E. at 323.
107. Id. at 678, 11 N.E. at 327.
108. Id.
109. For an argument that the fireman's rule denies firemen equal protection because of
the differential treatment between firemen and other public employees see Examination, supra
note 1.
110. Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 176-77, 192 N.E.2d
38, 46 (1963) (Gibson, J. dissenting).
11. Dini, 20 Ill.
2d 406, 416, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960).
112. 76 Ill.
App. 2d 164, 221 N.E.2d 521 (1966).
113. Id. at 176, 221 N.E.2d at 527.
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afforded a higher status than are firemen and policemen in Ohio.
As was stated earlier, this status has been extended to include firemen and policemen in Illinois as well.' 14 Therefore, the courts in
that jurisdiction have treated all public servants equally.
New York also grants invitee status to public employees. 1i5 In
Dillon v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., I 6 a county meter reader slipped and
fell on an oil spot, injuring himself on sharp edges of the floor.
Although the court reversed the plaintiff's favorable verdict on
other grounds, it specifically referred to the meter reader as a business invitee. I" Similarly, inGlassbrook v.Manhi Realty Corp., a
United States census taker slipped and fell on a worn carpet in an
apartment building stairway. The New York court held that since
the census taker was "engaged in the business of the public,"''' he
was owed that duty of care in maintenance of a building that is
20
owed an invitee.1
Massachusetts is a third example of the classification of public
employees as invitees. In Mounsey v. Ellard,12 1 an apartment building owner was held liable to a postman for ordinary negligence
which resulted in his injury while on the property. The court which
decided Mounsey relied in part upon a type of equal protection argument to find a general duty of reasonable care owed to all visitors
on the property.' 22 The court argued that since both a policeman
and a mailman enter upon land to perform their official duties, it is
logical that they be afforded the same degree of care.' 23 In Dini v.
Naiditch, a similar "logical" argument is posed suggesting that
since a firemen who saves property confers a greater benefit upon
the landowner than other public employees, the court finds illogical
24
the fact that he is not afforded the same duty of care.'
While case support is lacking in Ohio to show the status of public employees, Judge Gibson, in his dissenting opinion in Scheurer v.
Trustees of Open Bible Church,125 seems to suggest that the status of
114. Dini, 20 II1. 2d at 416, 170 N.E.2d at 885.
115. Dillon v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 9 A.D.2d 835, 192 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1959); Glassbrook v. Manhi Realty Corp., 279 A.D. 711, 108 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1951).
116. 9 A.D.2d 838, 192 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1959).
117. Id. at 835, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
118. 279 A.D. 711, 108 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1951).
119. Id. at 711, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
120. Id.
121. 363 Mass. 693, 700, 297 N.E.2d 43, 50 (1973).
122. Id. at 700, 297 N.E.2d at 50.
123. Id.
124. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 415, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960).
125. 175 Ohio St. 163, 176, 192 N.E.2d 38, 46 (1963) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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these public servants in Ohio would be that of an invitee. Judge
Gibson argues for raising the status of firemen to match that of
other public employees. 126 He objects to the fact that while a landowner does not invite the health or safety inspector, he owes them a
greater duty of care than he2 7owes to the fireman who offers the
landowner an equal service.1
After determining that firemen are licensees and other public
employees are treated as invitees, this Note shall now return to the
method of analysis presented in City of Xenia. 128 First, there are
two classes: public employees, on the one hand, and firemen and
policemen on the other. Second, there is differential treatment between the two classes. Third, this Note must determine whether distinctions between these two classes are "real and substantial"1 29 so
as to justify treating one class as invitees and the other as licensees.
This Note has already stated that the two points of distinction
between invitees and licensees are the placement of the benefit and
the presence of invitation or consent. 130 As the authorities quoted
above point out, public employees and firemen do not differ on these
two points. Both confer a benefit upon the property owner; the firemen perhaps even more than other public employees. Neither is
invited nor permitted by the landowner, but both gain their right to
enter by virtue of their duty to serve the state. It is easy to argue,
then, that there is no basis for excluding firemen and policemen
from the class of public employees to whom a greater duty of care is
owed.
This Note shall next determine whether there are any state interests which justify this discrepancy. In applying the fireman's rule
to bar recovery, several courts have offered public policies in favor
of denying firemen equal treatment.13 1 One Ohio court has suggested that the "burden" of compensating firemen "should be
shared by all taxpayers who share the benefits of protections pro132
vided by policemen and firemen."'
126. Id. at 176-77, 192 N.E.2d at 46.
127. Id.
128. 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920).
129. Id. at 452, 130 N.E.2d at 28.
130. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
131. Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963).
See also Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609 (1977) (assumption of risk, other
forms of compensation provided); Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983) (assumption of risk, other forms of compensation provided).
132. Scheurer, 175 Ohio St. at 170, 192 N.E.2d at 42.
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Judge Tobriner in his dissent in Walters v. Sloan13 3 takes issue
with the policy arguments proffered in favor of the fireman's rule.
Advocates of the rule argue that firemen have assumed the risk of
dangers which they have been trained to confront.13 4 They also argue that because it is difficult to determine the cause of a fire, and
therefore fault, judicial economy requires a total bar to recovery.135
Those decisions which have been written in opposition to the
fireman's rule discuss the differential treatment of public employees.' 3 6 As one decision pointed out, the fact that firemen receive
workers' compensation for their injuries should not bar their suits
against property owners as other public employees receive workers'
compensation and are left free to sue private negligent parties.
Judge Tobriner in his dissent in Walters v. Sloan,1 7 even goes so far
as to compare firemen with nonpublic employees and to demand
In comparing firemen
similar treatment in personal injury suits.'
to other occupational risk-takers such as utility repairmen, he
points out that while these workers are similarly compensated for
the danger of their jobs, they are not barred from suing for their
injuries.

39

Without expressly raising the equal protection issue, Judge Handler in Berko v. Freda140 criticizes the dissimilar treatment of firemen and other public employees. "This asserted distinction merely
disguises the fact [that] there are more similarities than differences
between police officers and fire fighters and a host of other public
employees."'' Judge Handler argues that while police officers face
danger on the job, so do many other public employees.14 2 Further,
although the level of risk may be higher, there is no proof of greater
compensation to balance the scale. 14
In summary, then, this Note has examined the public policy arguments advanced in favor of the differential treatment of one type
of public employee. Perhaps the strongest of these arguments may
133. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 571 P.2d 609, 614, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1977) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id. at 212, 571 P.2d at 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
135. Id.
136. See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Scheurer, 175 Ohio St. at 163, 192 N.E.2d at 38 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
137. 20 Cal. 3d at 208-13, 571 P.2d at 617-18, 142 Cal. Rptr at 158-60.
138. Id. at 213, 571 P.2d at 620, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
139. Id. at 213, 571 P.2d at 617, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
140. 93 N.J. 81, 95-96, 459 A.2d 663, 671 (1983) (Handler, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 95, 459 A.2d at 671.
142. Id. at 95-96, 459 A.2d at 671.
143. Id.
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be the assumption of the risk factor, that is firemen and policemen,
by the very nature of their occupations, accept the risk of injury as a
part of their daily routines.
However, if this is truly the underlying basis of the courts' differing treatment of firemen and policemen, a second equal protection issue is raised. If firemen and policemen are to be distinguished
from other public employees because they assume the risk of injury
in saving lives and property, how then can we account for their
being treated differently than other rescuers who can also be said to
assume the risk of injury and to whom a greater duty of care is
owed under the rescue doctrine?
The rescue doctrine holds that if a rescuer can show that the
defendant was negligent in putting the rescuee in a position of peril,
defendant's negligence is said to violate a duty of care to the rescuer. 14 In 1891, the plaintiff in Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorf14
sued for injuries incurred while rescuing a child who fell in front of
a train. The court allowed the rescuer to recover from the negligent
railroad company, thus founding the rescue doctrine.146 In doing
so, the court atffimed the public policy of rewarding the "strongest
dictates of humanity."14 7 The long line of rescue doctrine cases
which followed further supports this great regard for the value of
human life.
Applying the rescue doctrine requires the court to treat the issue
of the contributory negligence of the rescuer. In doing so, account
is taken of the need for quick decision, the opportunity for mistake,
and the apprehension and uncertainty on the part of the rescuer.148
The rescuer must first show the presence of all of the elements of
negligence: duty of care to the rescuee, proximate causation, violation of that duty and injury to the rescuer. 1"9 "[T]he violation of
the duty of the defendant to the rescuer occurs at the moment when
the duty to the person to be rescued is breached setting in motion
the forces triggering the rescue attempt."' 50
144. See Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lynch, 69 Ohio St. 123, 123, 68 N.E. 703, 703
(1903); Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 316, 316, 28 N.E. 172, 173 (1891);
Reese v. Minor, 2 Ohio App. 3d 440, 440, 442 N.E.2d 782, 783 (1981); Marks v. Wagner, 52
Ohio App. 2d 320, 320, 370 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1977).
145. 48 Ohio St. at 316, 28 N.E. at 172.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 323, 28 N.E. at 174.
148. Id.
149. See Reese v. Minor, 2 Ohio App. 3d 440, 441, 442 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1981) (no
proximate causation shown); Woodward v. Gray, 46 Ohio App. 177, 182, 188 N.E. 304, 306

(1933) (defendant found not negligent).
150. Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio App. 2d 320, 324, 370 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1977).
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Professor Bohlen has clarified the theory upon which the doctrine is based. According to him, one who endangers another person in the view of other people must expect that someone may come
to that person's rescue. 1 The duty to the rescuer arises from the
fact that the defendant is responsible for the rescuer's
risking his life
15 2
to save the person the defendant imperiled.
It is difficult to understand why the courts have not applied this
doctrine to firemen and policemen to allow them to recover for their
injuries. Surely they are rescuers. Judge Handler in his dissenting
opinion in Berko v. Freda15 3 agrees with this argument. He asserts
that since a fireman is a rescuer, and since rescuers are allowed to
recover for their injuries, it would be "just and fair" if firemen were
allowed to recover as well.' 54 "I am at a loss to understand why
this judicial philosophy is repudiated in a case such as this, where
the rescuer is not simply a good samaritan but a professional, who is
not invited to rescue, but is expected to rescue."15 5 He suggests that
since the rule is based upon the foreseeability that one will rescue an
imperiled person, the rule should be extended to firemen whose res' 156
cue attempt is almost "certain."
Again, defining the classifications created under an equal protection analysis, we find that a general class of rescuers can recover for
their injuries, while a subset of that class, firemen and policemen,
cannot. One's initial response to this observation may be that firemen are rescuers by profession while private citizens are not. However, we must look to the theory of recovery under the rule to
determine whether this distinction is relevant for equal protection
purposes. The purpose of the rescue doctrine, as stated earlier, is to
reward and encourage this humanitarian act. The fairness of the
rule lies in the fact that the duty of care owed to the rescuee can be
transferred to the rescuer because it is foreseeable that a rescue attempt will be made. The fault principle, too, is at work here as the
defendant must be shown to have put the rescuee in danger by his
negligence.
These policies are applicable irrespective of the professionalism
of the rescuer and render this distinction inconsequential. While
151.

F. BOHLEN, SrUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 569 n.33 (1926).

152. Id.; See also Carney v. Buyea, 271 A.D. 338, 344, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 908 (1946)
(defendant parking his car on an incline created undue risk of injury).
153. 93 N.J. 81, 100, 459 A.2d 663, 673 (1983) (Handler, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.

19871

FIREMAN'S RULE

the state wants to encourage rescue attempts and humanitarian acts
among private citizens, it also wants to encourage persons to enter
the worthy service departments of firemen and policemen. As already shown, the foreseeability factor is present both with private
citizen rescuers and professional rescuers, arguably to a greater extent with the latter. Finally, the degree of fault on the defendants'
part is not altered by the type of rescuer.
The inequity of the differential treatment among rescuers is illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a fire were to be
started in a hotel with many guests. Many of the guests were
trapped when a negligently constructed skywalk collapsed during
the fire.157 Firemen, policemen, paramedics, ambulance workers
and nurses all sue the hotel owners for the physical and emotional
injuries they sustained while attempting to rescue the victims. The
court awards damages to all of those rescuers injured excluding the
firemen and policemen. While each rescuer knowingly accepted the
risks involved, and many were being paid for their time, only the
firemen and policemen are barred from recovery because no duty of
care was owed to them. This is the result under the Ohio fireman's
rule as it stands today.
Again, in examining the law of the surrounding jurisdictions, we
8
find the rescue doctrine common to all of them. In New York, 15
Indiana, 159 Massachusetts1 60 and Illinois, 1 6 1 "[a] person who is injured while attempting to rescue one put in peril through the negli'1 62
gence of a third party, can recover from that third party.
In his dissent, Judge Handler urges the New Jersey court to follow the theory of the rescue doctrine by transferring the basis upon
157. See In re Skywalks, No. CV 81-15200, slip op. (W.D. Mo. 1983). Skywalks is a case
of similar facts brought in Missouri. When a hotel skywalk collapsed during a fire, rescuers
of all types came to the scene. A group of rescuers, made up of nurses and paramedics, sued
in a class action suit and recovered for their injuries. Recovery by the firemen and policemen
only was barred by the fireman's rule. Later, firemen and policemen brought a separate class
action suit.
158. Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1968); Rodriguez v. New York State Thruway Authority, 82 A.D.2d 853, 440 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981).
159. Neal, Admr. v. Home Builders, Inc., 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280 (1953); Lambert
v. Parrish, 492 N.E.2d 289 (Ind.App. 1986).
160. For Massachusetts rescue doctrine cases, see Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. 365,
446 N.E.2d 78 (1983); Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506 (1879).
161. For Illinois cases on the same subject, see Cox v. Stutts, 130 Ill.
App. 3d 1018, 474
N.E.2d 1382 (1985); McGinty v. Nissen, 127 Ill.
App. 3d 618, 469 N.E.2d 445 (1984);
Seibutis v. Smith, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 1010, 404 N.E.2d 950 (1980).
162. Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.2d 782, 784, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (1960); see also
Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921); Eckert v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871).
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which liability to firemen is determined to the fault concept. "Our
most basic jurisprudence affirms a right of redress for those injured
as a result of the wrongdoings of others. We have on numerous
defenses
occasions expressed antipathy towards immunities ' 1and
63
that perpetuate the injustice of unredressed wrongs."
V.

CONCLUSION

The common law governing the suits of firemen and policemen
against tortfeasors for personal injury damages is in need of a complete restructuring. The most traditional fireman's rule bars firemen from recovery for injuries directly resulting from a fire and
categorizes them as licensees in their suits against landowners for
injury resulting from the negligent maintenance of their property.
The Ohio courts have not modernized, or indeed even altered to any
extent, this rule since its creation, and the landowner's duty system
upon which it is based is outdated.
The determination of whether firemen and policemen can recover for their injuries should depend instead, upon the presence of
fault, the basis of all tort law. In short, the property owner should
be liable to the firemen for his injuries directly resulting from the
fire when the landowner negligently or intentionally caused the fire.
The fireman should be owed that same duty of care owed to rescuers and public and private employees - a general duty of care owed
64
to all foreseeably injured.'
This restructuring would remedy the inequitable treatment suffered by firemen and policemen, and at the same time, would further two important public policies. Allowing recovery by firemen
would serve to deter negligence in causing fires and would encourage persons to enter this important area of public service which
asks man every day to put another's safety and welfare before his
own.
JULIANNE PALUMBO

163. Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 99-100, 459 A.2d 663, 673 (1983) (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
164. The idea that a person owes a general duty of care to all foreseeably injured due to
the person's lack of due care in the management of his or her property is a fundamental
concept in the common law. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d
561, 564, 70 Cal Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (citing Hearen v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883)).

